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Explaining Bond Spreads Via Default Risk, Taxes, Rating Transition 
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Dean Johnson and Howard Qi* 
Michigan Technological University 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study develops a semi-structural framework of bond pricing that incorporates 
default risk, taxes, and bond rating transition, whereas prior papers have primarily 
focused on the first (and more recently the second) factor. After capturing the three 
effects, the remaining spread between corporate bond rates and risk free rates can 
intuitively be attributed to liquidity. Models estimated without all three effects cannot 
intuitively dismiss the "unexplained" spread as a liquidity premium. This is confirmed by 
applying the framework to samples from two periods (1973-1993, and 2004-2010).   
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1.  Introduction 
In this paper, we generalize the structural models for defaultable taxable bonds to 
incorporate rating transition estimated exogenously. The incorporation of rating transition 
is not an arbitrary decision. First, as we show, it improves the structural model calibration 
procedure which originally ruled out the possibility of rating migrations before default. 
Second, since ratings and the fundamental change in issuers’ risks are not accurately 
reflected or instantly correlated,1  it is sensible to model the investors’ pricing process as 
the expectation of the underlying risks signaled by ratings. Third, as we demonstrate, the 
unexplained spread component in structural models with default and personal taxes alone 
displays a strong rating-related pattern. A consistent and robust finding is that default and 
taxes have the least explanatory power for BBB ratings in terms of percentage of the 
observed spreads. This is direct evidence of rating transition risk being priced.  If 
transition risk is ruled out, one would have to accept the conclusion that junk bonds are 
more liquid than investment grade bonds, which is extremely counter-intuitive since 
many institutional investors are prohibited from investing in junk bonds.  
 
These observations indicate that the unexplained spread component left by default and 
tax-related premia is very hard to attribute to liquidity risk alone. Instead, it strongly 
suggests a very different factor is at work – rating transitions.  Accordingly, we would 
expect to remove or greatly reduce the bothersome rating-specific pattern in the 
unexplained spread, mitigate the over-shooting problem for low rate bonds and create an 
intuitive liquidity premium.  These suppositions are shown to be true in our model.  
 
2.  Background 
 
Most structural bond pricing models based on default risk can explain only a very small 
portion of the observed spreads for investment-grade bonds. On the other hand, the 
models appear to be able to explain a significant portion of the observed spreads for low 
grade bonds, and in some cases, even exceed or "overshoot" the observed values.  Both 
are problems in structural models that deserve investigation.   
 
Jones et. al. (1984) demonstrated that the Merton-type model predicts a credit spread well 
below the observed yield spread, especially for high-grade bonds.2  Since then many 
structural models have emerged to incorporate other factors: stochastic interest rates 
(Longstaff and Schwartz 1995), endogenous default, (Black and Cox 1976, Leland 1994, 
1998, and Leland and Toft 1996), strategic default by stockholders, (Anderson and 
Sundaresan 1996, Anderson, Sundaresan, and Tychon 1996, and Mella-Barral and 
Perraudin 1997), and stationary leverage ratios (Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein 2001).3   
 
                                                
1 See Kliger and Sarig (2000), and Altman and Rijken (2004). 
2 See Helwege and Turner (1999) and Elton et. al. (2001). 
3 In addition, Duffie and Lando (2001) consider noisy accounting information. Zhou (2001) incorporates 
jump risk. Goldstein et. al. (2001) include dynamic capital structure. 
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Despite these efforts, there is no fundamental improvement in predicting credit spreads 
(see Lyden and Saraniti 2000; and Eom et. al. 2004). Huang and Huang (2003) 
investigated most representative structural models only to find that their performance is 
fairly stable for different parameter choices and credit risk accounts for only a very small 
portion (20 to 30 percent) of the spread for high-grade bonds. The performance appears 
to be better for low-grade bonds, but the enhanced explanatory power may be spurious 
because of the overshooting problem of the structural models for junk bonds (e.g., see 
Eom et. al. 2004).  Therefore, the performance of these structural models is far from 
satisfactory and reliable for all ratings. 
 
One factor previously ignored in term structure models is personal taxes.  It has been 
found that personal taxes explain a significant portion of corporate bond spreads. In many 
cases, the tax premium exceeds the default premium (Elton et. al. 2001).  Further, tax 
effects with endogenous capital structures demonstrate rich interactions with default risk 
and have direct influences on bond prices.  The tax effects also have a strong impact on 
capital structure, which in turn indirectly affects bond prices (Liu et. al. 2006).   
 
The primary focus to date has been on the explanatory power of these models without 
careful thought to the "unexplained" portion of the spread, which is typically attributed to 
the unobservable liquidity factor.  Naturally, if the model completely explained the 
spread, one would not need to bother with the unexplained spread.  Driessen (2005) 
attempted to decompose credit spreads into the default-, liquidity- and tax-driven 
components.  As we will show here, while personal taxes improve the model's descriptive 
power, the resulting pattern in the "unexplained" spread is not intuitively related to 
liquidity. 
 
To date, bond rating transitions have not been combined with the structural models.  In 
reality, most firms experience downgrades before they end up in bankruptcy. Graham and 
Harvey (2001) found that CFOs ranked bond ratings higher than the tax advantage of 
interest deductibility when determining their capital structure. According to Kisgen 
(2006), “firms near a credit rating upgrade or downgrade issue less debt relative to equity 
than firms not near a change in rating.”  Indeed, the concern for credit ratings is justified. 
Credit ratings determine whether many institutional investors are allowed to hold a firm’s 
bonds.  
 
Many rating-based reduced-form models have been developed. The two most widely 
used are by Duffie and Singleton (1997) and Jarrow et. al. (1997). One may ask whether 
ratings simply reflect fundamental change in issuers’ risks or whether they carry some 
additional information value. Kliger and Sarig (2000) showed that rating information 
does not affect firm value, but that debt value increases (decreases) and equity value 
decreases (rises) when Moody’s announces better (worse) than expected ratings. This 
effect implies that the rating’s signaling is not accurate. Investors tend to believe that 
bond ratings are slow in responding to changes in corporate credit quality.4  Similar 
findings are reported in the surveys by Ellis (1998) and Baker and Mansi (2002). 
                                                
4 See, e.g., Altman and Rijken (2004). 
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Therefore, (1) bond ratings are an important factor in determining bond prices; (2) they 
are dynamic in nature; and (3) they contain additional information value.  
 
 
3.  Model Calibration and Rating Transitions 
 
Our calibration procedure finds its root in Huang and Huang (2003). The essence of the 
procedure is to choose the unobservable parameters (e.g., asset volatility) such that the 
model generates other variables (e.g., cumulative default probability, equity premium, 
etc.) that match the observed values. This procedure is used to make sure that we did not 
obtain spurious results. For example, a model may appear to perform very well, but we 
may find that the seemingly accurate model-generated spread is mainly due to an 
unrealistically high model-implied default risk. Therefore, the true performance of a 
model is the accuracy of the generated spread when the implied default risk is adjusted to 
match the observed values.  
 
In this paper, we applied the models to 4- and 10-year bonds. The aggregate bond data for 
the period 1973-1993 from Huang and Huang (2003) is used for direct comparability.  
The target values of the selected parameters and the observed aggregate historical spreads 
for each bond rating are given in Table 1.  
 
For tractability, we assume away tax-timing effect if the bonds are traded before maturity.  
The long-term capital gains tax rate is a fraction α of the regular income tax rate τ. Tax 
rates applied to capital gains and losses are equal and there is no limit on loss deduction. 
In the event of default, a portion of the principal (or residual) is paid, and the remaining 
loss is treated as capital loss immediately deductible from an investor’s taxable income.5   
 
The rating transition is accounted for by applying our endogenously obtained spreads to a 
rating transition matrix under the equivalent martingale measure.6  This should capture 
two effects that have not been previously considered in models: First, the probability of a 
firm assigned one rating having its true fundamentals similar to those in other ratings, i.e., 
the imperfectness of rating-based information; second, the probability of a firm indeed 
migrating among different rating categories before the bond maturity.  
 
 
                                                
5 Interest income and short-term capital gains are taxed at the ordinary income tax rate while long-term 
gains are taxed at a lower capital-gains rate. The ordinary income tax rate for the highest income group is 
35% for both individuals and corporations. Corporate bond income is subject to state taxes but Treasury 
bond income is not.  Maximum state marginal income tax rates generally range from five to ten percent, per 
Commerce Clearing House (1997) and Elton et. al. (2001).  The effective tax rate of corporate bonds is 
equal to τ = τF + τS(1 - τF), where τS is the state income tax rate and τF is the federal income tax rate. The 
last term reflects that state taxes are deductible from income for the purpose of federal taxes. Amortization 
is an important feature of bond investments. We assumed straight-line method. 
6 The observed transition matrices are not appropriate for such operations. The existence of a unique 
transition matrix under the equivalent martingale measure is implied by the assumption of market 
completeness. We thank Manfred Frühwirth for this observation. 
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TABLE 1 
TARGET PARAMETERS FOR MODEL CALIBRATION 
 
 
This table shows the values of the target parameters used for model calibration. The last two columns include the 
average observed yield spreads. The target data are from Huang and Huang (2003) for the period 1973-1993.  We set 
recovery rate for the LT model to 80% per Andrade and Kaplan (1998) and Eom et. al. (2004), which indicates that the 
cost of financial distress is in the range of 15 to 20 percent of the firm’s going concern value. We set the target recovery 
rate to 80% for the LT model. For the CG model, recovery is defined as a percentage of bond face value regardless of 
debt maturity, and we set the recovery rate to 50 percent, similar to that used in Colin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) 
and Huang and Huang (2003). 
  
 
 
 
Target Parameters for Model Calibration 
Observed Average Yield 
Spread 
 
Credit 
Rating 
Equity 
Premium 
(%) 
 
4-Year Cumulative 
Default Probability 
(%) 
10-Year 
Cumulative 
Default Probability 
(%) 
4-Year 
Bond 
(bps) 
10-Year 
Bond 
(bps) 
AAA 5.38 0.04 0.77 55 63 
AA 5.60 0.23 0.99 65 91 
A 5.99 0.35 1.55 96 123 
BBB 6.55 1.24 4.39 158 194 
BB 7.30 8.51 20.63 320 320 
B 8.76 23.32 43.91 470 470 
 
 
We followed the procedure of Wei (2000) to construct our rating transition matrix.  That 
is, we adopted the risk neutral 1-year rating transition matrix estimated by Wei (2000). 
Next we derived the 4- and 10-year transition matrices by assuming the transition is 
purely Markovian and time-homogeneous.7  Furthermore, we normalized the transition 
matrices by redistributing the probability mass for categories other than AAA through B. 
This was required to isolate the transition effect from default risk (i.e., probability of 
migrating to default), noises from not-rated categories, and the possibility of withdraw (or 
withdrawn ratings). These standard adjustments are normally made to smooth the 
transition probabilities (see for example, Wei 2000, and Carty 1997). Table 2 shows the 
4- and 10-year rating transition matrices we used in this study.  
                                                
7 These two assumptions are commonly used in literature, e.g., Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997), to 
simplify the computation, although there has been research showing that these two assumptions may not 
hold well due to the “momentum effect” (see Bahar and Nagal 2001). 
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TABLE 2 
RATING TRANSITION MATRIX UNDER THE EQUIVALENT MARTINGALE MEASURE 
 
Panel A is the accumulative four-year rating transition matrix, and panel B is the accumulative 10-year rating transition 
matrix. Both are derived from the one-year transition matrix under the equivalent martingale measure given in Wei 
(2000). Given ratings below B and other not-rated (NR) categories are not considered, the transition matrices are 
normalized to 100 percent for all possible migrations among AAA through B ratings (see Wei 2000, and Carty 1997). 
 
Panel A: Four-year accumulative rating transition matrix (%) 
 
 AAA AA A BBB BB B Total 
AAA 77.17 18.67 3.38 0.58 0.15 0.05 100 
AA 2.14 71.92 21.73 3.30 0.52 0.39 100 
A 0.31 7.10 73.23 15.81 2.50 1.04 100 
BBB 0.13 1.35 14.97 67.55 12.17 3.83 100 
BB 0.12 0.42 3.16 19.46 56.52 20.33 100 
B 0.10 0.92 3.43 8.44 37.77 49.32 100 
 
 
Panel B: Ten-year accumulative rating transition matrix (%) 
 
 AAA AA A BBB BB B Total 
AAA 53.08 30.59 12.27 3.01 0.68 0.36 100 
AA 3.60 47.29 34.98 10.47 2.34 1.32 100 
A 0.81 11.71 52.95 24.86 6.43 3.24 100 
BBB 0.38 3.99 24.49 46.05 16.41 8.69 100 
BB 0.30 1.74 10.42 28.60 33.46 25.48 100 
B 0.25 1.46 6.21 14.80 27.87 49.41 100 
 
 
 
4.  Risky Bond Pricing with Default Risk, Taxes and Rating Transitions 
 
The tax-related premium cannot be separated from the default premium.8  In addition, 
personal taxes affect the optimal leverage, which in turn affect corporate bond pricing 
and yield spread; therefore taxes must be incorporated under specific capital structure 
assumptions. We next develop models for exogenous and endogenous leverage and rating 
transitions.  
 
4a.  Exogenous Leverage 
 
We start by extending the basic framework of Colin-Dufresne and Goldstein model 
(2001), hereafter the CG model. It assumes a stationary mean-reverting leverage ratio. 
The CG model is a two-factor model where the spot rate rt follows the Vasicek (1977) 
process and the firm value Vt follows a geometric Brownian motion. Default occurs when 
the firm value hits the bankruptcy threshold K, or ( ) 0/log == tt VKl .  The firm value Vt 
is specified under the risk-neutral measure (Π) by: 
                                                
8 For example, the tax rebate is directly related to the timing of default and the value of recovery. 
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 )()( 1 tdzdtrV
dV
t
t
t Π+−= σδ                                                                  (1) 
 
where δ is the payout ratio and σ is the volatility parameter. The risk-free tax-free spot 
rate rt obeys the following process: 
 
 )()( 2 tdzdtrdr tt
Π+−= ηθβ                                                                 (2) 
 
where β, θ and η are constants with dtdzdz ς=ΠΠ 21 .  The log-default threshold kt is 
mean-reverting: 
 
 dtkrydk tttt ])([ −−−−= θφνλ                                            (3) 
 
where tt Vy log= , )( ν−ty sets the target threshold with ν  and λ adjusting the mean-
reverting speed, and 0≥φ . This stationary process reflects the fact that firms tend to 
issue additional debt when their leverage ratio falls below some target and are less willing 
to replace maturing debt when it is above that target.   
 
If default does not occur before maturity T, the bond investor receives the principal 
scaled to a unit payoff at T. Otherwise, a fractional loss in principal, L, is incurred.  The 
price of a risky tax-free bond is thus given by: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )],,1[,, 00000 TlrLQTrDlrP TT −=                                                    (4) 
 
where ),( 0 TrD  is the price of the risk-free zero-coupon bond and ),,( 00 TlrQ
T  is the 
cumulative probability of default before T under the T-forward measure.  Using the 
method of the first passage time probability density and discretizing the interest rate 
range (with a lower bound rL and an upper bound rU) into rn  equal intervals by 
rLULLi nrrirrirr /)( −×+=Δ+=  for ),...,2,1( rni∈  and time into Tn  equal intervals 
with tjnjTt Tj Δ== /  for ),1( Tnj∈ , where TnTt /=Δ , Q
T(r0, l0, T) at time zero is: 
             ∑∑
= =
=
T rn
j
n
i
ji
T tlrqTlrQ
1 1
000 ),,(),,(                                                                 (5) 
where l0 is the initial leverage ratio and q(ri, l0, tj) is the probability mass in a grid (∆r × 
∆t) at the level of (ri, tj).  The specific form of  q(ri, l0, tj) is given in Colin-Dufresne and 
Goldstein (2001). 
 
For defaultable coupon bonds, we assumed that the unpaid coupons have a 100% write-
down, i.e., the coupon loss rate 1=couponL .  If default does not occur, the bondholder pays 
a regular income tax on each coupon and a capital gains tax on the difference between the 
principal and purchase price.  If default occurs before maturity, the bondholder receives 
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(1 – L) of face value, and a tax rebate based on the capital gains tax rate ατ,  where τ is 
the ordinary income tax rate and α is equal to 1 if the loss is short term or less if it is long 
term.  According to Qi et. al. (2010), the price of the risky taxable coupon bond with 
straight-line amortization is:9 
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where, 
 
 ( ) ( )mTmm tlrQtrD ,,, 000 Δ=Γ                                                                   (7) 
 
 ( ) ( )[ ]mTmm tlrQtrDZ ,,1, 000 −=                                            (8)    
),( 0 mtrD  is the price of the risk-free tax-free zero coupon bond with maturity mt ,  and 
( )mT tlrQ ,, 00Δ  is the incremental default probability over time period ]( mm tt ,1−  under the 
T-forward measure using ( )mtrD ,0 , the price of riskless tax-free bond with maturity 
mtt = , as the numeraire. 
 
4b. Endogenous Leverage 
 
The Leland-Toft Model (1996), hereafter the LT model, is based on the tradeoff between 
the benefit of corporate tax shields and the costs associated with bankruptcy. The firm 
can endogenously choose a bankruptcy boundary which maximizes firm value. The 
optimal leverage is therefore set endogenously. Firm value of an unlevered firm, V, is 
assumed to follow the diffusion process: 
 
           ( )[ ] dZdttV
V
dV
σδµ +−= ,                                                                        (9) 
 
where ( )tV ,µ  is the expected rate of return on the firm’s asset, δ  is the total payout 
ratio,10 Z is a standard Wiener process, and σ  is the volatility parameter.11 
 
The LT model assumes the firm issues debt continuously to replace the debt that is 
expiring, hence maintaining stationary leverage. Within a unit of time, say one year, the 
firm issues debt d that has a continuous constant coupon flow c(t), principal )(tp , and 
                                                
9 We have studied cases with and without amortization. The difference in the results is small, thus we only 
present “with-amortization” framework.  All the results are available upon request. 
10 This is a proportion of firm value paid to all security holders. 
11 A similar process was used by Merton (1974), Black and Cox (1976), and Brennan and Schwartz (1978). 
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maturity t. The asset value process of the levered firm continues without time limit until it 
hits a default boundary VB, at which the firm defaults on its debt. Upon default, 
bondholders receive a fixed portion ρ  of the asset value VB, or (1 – ρ) is the fraction of 
firm value lost due to default. Suppose the firm continuously issues new debt with 
maturity T years as long as the firm remains solvent. The value of all outstanding debts D 
is determined by integrating ( )tVVd B ,,  over the period of T: 
 
 ( ) ( )∫
=
=
T
t
BB dttVVdTVVD
0
,,,,                                                       (10) 
 
The levered firm value equals the unlevered firm value plus leverage benefits less 
bankruptcy costs. Given the unlevered asset value V(t), equity value ( )TVVE B ,, , tax 
benefit ( )BVVh ,  of leverage, bankruptcy cost ( )BVVB , , and outstanding debt ( )TVVD B ,, , 
the levered firm’s value ( )TVVW B ,,  is: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )BBB VVBVVhVTVVW ,,,, −+=                                          (11) 
 
where  
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where 
2
2 )2/(
σ
σδ −−
=
ra , ⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
=
BV
Vb ln , 2
2/1222 ]2)[(
σ
σσ raz += , and Cτ  is the corporate 
income tax rate, Eτ  is the effective tax rate on equity returns, and ECτ  is the capital gains 
tax rate on equity appreciation.12  Both dividends and capital gains (or losses) of equity 
are subject to taxes. Dividend income is taxed at the ordinary income tax rate τ, whereas 
capital gains are taxed at .αττ =EC
13  The effective tax rate on equity returns Eτ  is the 
weighted average of dividend and capital gains tax rates. Graham (2003) suggests that the 
effective equity tax rate is ( ) δτατδτ +−= 1E  where the weight depends on the payout 
ratio δ .14  Given the par-bond condition assumed in the LT model, Liu et. al. (2006) 
showed the price of the firm’s new debt (per unit of time) is: 
                                                
12 For the derivation of (12) and (13), see Leland and Toft (1996) and Qi et. al. (2010). 
13 This tax treatment holds for the sample period of the data we use to calibrate the model. 
14 See Graham (2003, p. 1095; 2000, p. 1912; 1999, p. 153). 
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and ( )⋅N  denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution. The parameters ( )th1 , ( )th2 , 
( )tq1 and ( )tq2  are functions of personal taxes and their analytical forms can be found in 
Liu et. al. (2006).  
 
4c.  Defining Yield and Spread 
 
For a coupon bond with maturity T = tM, price P(T), and tax rate τ, the yield to maturity 
Y(T,τ) at t0 can be obtained by solving the following equation: 
 ∑+=
=
−−
M
i
itTYTTYT ceeP
1
),(),( ττ                                                                 (15) 
 
where ti is the time associated with the cash flow in the ith period and c is the coupon rate. 
The yield spread is the difference between the yield on a corporate bond YC(T, τ) and that 
on a Treasury YT(T, τF) with the same maturity T, 
   
 ),(),()( F
TC TYTYTYS ττ −=                                                      (16) 
 
Since corporate bonds are subject to default risk and state taxes while Treasury bonds are 
not, yield on corporate bonds contains a premium to compensate investors for these 
disadvantages. 
 
4d.  Rating Transition and Corporate Bond Spreads  
 
So far the structural models are static in that they implicitly assume a bond would either 
remain in the same rating or in default before maturity.15  It does not consider the 
possibilities that a bond may end up in other different ratings at maturity. The markets are 
                                                
15 This is because the asset volatility σ is treated as a constant in both the LT and the CG models over the 
bond’s maturity and cannot be calibrated to match the default rate for multiple ratings at a time.  The CG 
model, in addition, is also calibrated to match only one rating’s leverage over the bond’s life. By doing so, 
they all implicitly consider two possibilities – maintaining the same rating (with the same asset volatility σ 
and leverage), or in default. 
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quite different for investment-grade bonds and junk bonds, the possibility of rating 
migration itself (especially across this border) would introduce unique market-related 
risk16 which is not considered in the original structural models. Incorporating rating 
transition risk accounts for the probability of a bond being downgraded and/or upgraded 
before its maturity as well as the probability that a bond assigned one rating has financial 
fundamentals or true credit risk more similar to bonds in other ratings.17 In actual 
procedure, we derive the 4- and 10-year transition matrices based on the 1-year risk 
neutral estimate by Wei (2000). We assume the rating transition is a time-homogeneous 
Markov process and smoothed the transition probabilities by normalizing the total 
probability to one for the ratings we consider. This is a standard procedure that allows us 
to remove the impact of migration to/from other ratings.18  The procedure involves two 
steps as follows. 
 
First, the models with taxes are calibrated strictly based on the rating-specific data in 
Table 1. The spreads obtained in this manner are completely unaffected by rating 
transitions and we use iYS  to denote the generated spread for the ith rating. 
 
Second, the transition matrices shown in Table 2 are applied to the spreads generated in 
the first step. This is done with the follow approximation  (with a slight abuse of the 
summation sign), 
 
( )∑
=
×−+=
B
AAAj
ijijii aYSYSYSYS                                                           (17) 
 
where iYS  is the spread for the ith rating after we account for rating transitions, and aij is 
the element of the transition matrix, which represents the cumulative probability of 
migrating from the ith to the jth rating. Since the value of aij will be exogenously 
determined, (17) is a reduced-form relationship. The added terms, ( )∑
=
×−
B
AAAj
ijij aYSYS , 
are modifications for rating transition effect. Essentially, (17) can be thought of as the 
weighted average of all possible ratings a bond may end up with before maturity. This is 
                                                
16 Imagine a BBB-rated bond being downgraded to BB, one immediate consequence is that many 
institutional investors (such as pension funds and savings banks, etc.) holding this bond would have to 
liquidate their holdings. Simply due to such an increase in supply, bond price would drop even though the 
firm’s fundamentals have not changed much. Furthermore, with many institutional investors bailing out, 
the issuer of this newly downgraded BB bond would find it much harder to raise new capital which in turn 
makes the existing debt riskier. Therefore, the significantly higher default rate of junk bonds may be 
partially attributed to this rating change. 
17 There is evidence that rating changes lag rather than lead security-price changes. Wakeman (1981) 
argues that rating changes merely provide “a single, easily communicated code that incorporates all the 
major ingredients of the bond’s risk”. Kliger and Sarig (2000) point out that rating changes are triggered by 
economic events, and therefore it is unclear how much of the price reaction to rating changes is due to the 
rating announcement and how much is to triggering economic event itself. 
18 This is designed to remove or reduce the biases in rating transition risk estimates due to not-rated 
categories, firms withdrawn from ratings, and bankruptcy states. 
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to overcome the shortcoming of the models that only one asset volatility σ (hence one 
rating) is allowed. The linear form of (17) is used because the transition matrices are 
under the risk neutral measure and any other form implies risk premium.  
 
The resulting spreads iYS , where i ranges from AAA through B, are therefore generated 
endogenously within our structural framework and reflect the impacts from all three 
factors: default risk, taxes and transition risk. 
 
5.  Results and Analysis 
 
In our simulation, the parameter values were chosen as close as possible to the original 
models. For the CG model, we chose β = 0.1, δ = 0.06, σ = 0.2, η = 0.015, θ = 0.08, λ = 
0.18, ς  = – 0.2, φ  = 2.8, ν = 0.6, L = 0.5 and the initial short rate r0 = 0.08. These 
parameter values resemble those used by CG.  In the numerical calculations, we set rL = 
0.001 and rU = 0.18 as the lower and upper bounds for the range of the spot rate rt and 
discretize this range into nr = 25 equal intervals.  The coupon rate was set to 8%.  For the 
endogenous leverage model, we employed the same interest rate (r = 8%) and payout 
ratio ( 6=δ %) as used by LT. The bankruptcy cost rate was set to 20% of the firm value 
as suggested by Andrade and Kaplan (1998). The coupon rate, c, is a decision variable, 
which is optimally generated by the calibrated LT model. 
 
5a.  Yield Spreads Generated by the Models without Rating Transition Risk 
 
Figure 1 reports the CG and LT model results for 4-year bonds with the personal tax rate 
equal to 0% (i.e., Default risk only) and 23% (Default and taxes).  The 23% personal tax 
rate was chosen such that the equity return tax rate, estimated as a weighted average of 
personal income and capital gains tax rates, i.e., ( ) δτατδτ +−= 1E ,  is equal to 12% as 
estimated by Graham (1999).  The results for τ = 10% and τ = 30% are available and have 
similar properties to the results displayed here.  The upper panels are expressed in basis 
points and the lower panel in percentage of the observed values.  
 
As seen in Figure 1, default risk alone explains very little in absolute terms or percentage 
terms of the observed spread for high quality bonds.  Personal taxes considerably 
enhanced the model performance, especially for high quality bonds. For example with τ = 
23%, the CG model explained 41 basis points of the observed spread on 4-year AAA 
bonds compared to 0.6 basis points with no taxes. As rating decreases, the relative 
improvement due to taxes becomes smaller. However, even for BBB bonds, taxes still 
contribute at least an additional 44 basis points.  The 4-year bond results of the LT model 
display an analogous pattern to the CG model. 
 
The results for the 10-year bonds are found in Figure 2 and mimic the 4-year bond results.  
That is, default risk alone explains a small percentage of the spread while personal taxes 
increase the model's performance for all bond ratings, especially high quality bonds.  For 
example, the CG model’s explanatory power increased from 3 to 45 basis points for AAA 
bonds by incorporating income taxes, while the LT model can still improve its predictive 
power by 15.8% on the BBB bonds. 
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In summary, personal taxes are an important factor in explaining the spreads on the risky 
bonds and after incorporating personal taxes the structural models do much better in 
explaining the spreads on risky bonds.  
 
5b.  Evidence for the Rating Transition Risk 
 
As shown in these Figures 3 and 4, structural models with personal taxes perform 
significantly better than traditional models considering default risk only. Our study 
supports this view. However, when we express the model-generated spreads as a 
percentage of the observed values (shown in the lower panels), a troubling pattern 
emerges. The model explanatory power after accounting for default risk and personal 
taxes exhibited a strong rating-dependent pattern that cannot be readily explained by 
liquidity risk.19 In particular, the curves showed the least explanatory power occurred at 
the BBB rating: a feature that held true independent of bond maturities (i.e., true for 4- 
and 10-year bonds), and the specific models used despite their drastic difference in the 
capital structure assumptions. This is a highly uncomfortable result which does not match 
financial intuition. That is, if only taxes and default risk are included, the remaining 
unexplained spread attributable to liquidity would imply that junk bonds are more liquid 
than most investment grade bonds.  
 
In reality, there are regulations that prohibit certain institutional investors from investing 
in junk bonds. When a bond is down-graded to BBB, its investors have increased 
concerns that any further down-grading may result in a sudden relative increased supply 
(from these restricted investors) which pushes down the bond price. This concern 
warrants an additional premium that is not related to default risk (because BBB bond 
ratings are not default states); not related to taxes (because tax treatments do not change); 
and not strictly related to illiquidity (because BBB rating should be more liquid than junk 
bond ratings).  Thus, in order to capture the premium due to a possible rating change, we 
incorporate rating transition risk into our models.  
 
In addition to the strong evidence that liquidity is not the only missing factor, liquidity is 
also the most elusive factor in asset pricing research because there is no accurate 
quantified definition for it.20  Accordingly, a model should first consider as many 
important quantifiable factors as possible and understand their behaviors. This allows a 
better understanding of the nature of the liquidity risk and the estimation of its magnitude. 
In sum, there are both theoretical and empirical reasons for incorporating rating transition 
risk in the model. 
 
                                                
19 Previous studies, for example, de Jong et. al. (2005), and Liu et. al. (2006), have tended to implicitly 
assume the portion of the spread that is unexplained by taxes and default risk comes from liquidity. 
20 In most cases, asset pricing is done by assuming market completeness and no arbitrage. Liquidity is a 
result of limited market of demand and supply. As a result it is hard, if not impossible, to “catch” the 
liquidity factor in a structural arbitrage-free framework. 
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Figure 1. Default and tax premiums on 4-year bonds. The upper panels show the observed and model-generated 
spreads in bps. The lower panels express the model-generated spreads as a percentage of the observed values. The two 
left panels are for the CG model (where leverage ratio is exogenously given) and the two right for the LT model (where 
the model endogenously chooses the optimal capital structure). Notice that the explanatory power of both models 
unanimously reaches the lowest level in percentage terms at BBB. 
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Figure 2. Default and tax premiums on 10-year bonds. The upper panels show the observed and model-generated 
spreads. The lower panels express the model-generated spreads as a percentage of the observed values. The two left 
panels are for the CG model (where leverage ratio is exogenously given) and the two right for the LT model (where the 
model endogenously chooses the optimal capital structure). Notice that the explanatory power of both models 
unanimously reaches the lowest level in percentage terms at BBB. 
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5c.  Rating Transition  
 
Incorporating the rating transition factor should replace the rating-dependent liquidity 
pattern with a new liquidity pattern that makes more intuitive sense.  We also expect the 
model to generate higher spreads for high-grade bonds and mitigate the possible 
overshooting problem for low grade bonds.  More specifically, the unexplained spread 
attributed to liquidity should be smaller for high quality bonds and larger for low quality 
bonds. 
 
The overshooting problem of structural models has been documented in several studies 
(e.g., Eom et. al. 2004). It manifests in two ways: (1) for junk bonds, the model may 
appear to have a much larger explanatory power (even in percentage terms) for the 
observed spreads; (2) the model-generated spreads may exceed the observed spreads, 
especially for junk bonds.  While the latter can be easily noticed, the former is more 
subtle and may lead to spurious conclusion, which could be more harmful. We argue the 
main reason for this overshooting problem is the neglecting of rating transition. In 
previous structural models, it is implicitly assumed that a bond will either default with 
cumulative default probability pd or remain in the same rating with probability dp−1  
before maturity. There is no other scenario for a bond. However, it is well documented 
that low-grade bonds have a net propensity to move up over time.21  In other words, 
focusing only on the default probability (as in the previous structural models) 
oversimplifies the situation and the “sunnier side” is ignored for low-grade bonds. That is, 
the spread explained by default, taxes and rating transition will be smaller for low quality 
bonds than found in a model with only default and taxes.  Thus, we should expect the 
overshooting problem to be mitigated after rating transitions is incorporated in the model. 
 
By the same token, for high quality bonds, rating transition implies that beyond 
remaining unchanged or default, the bond also has a probability to be downgraded before 
maturity. Considering this alternative path of rating evolvement, we expect the rating 
transition effect to further increase the model-generated spreads.  For bonds in the middle 
range of the rating spectrum, the overall effect of rating transition depends on which 
factor is dominant (i.e., the influence of being upgraded or downgraded). 
 
Figures 3 and 4 are the main results of our paper.  Figure 3 presents spreads with and 
without rating transitions.  Figure 4 documents the implied liquidity premiums with and 
without rating transitions.  The results are exactly as we expected.   
 
In Figure 3, the thin curve in each panel represents default risk and taxes to serve as a 
comparison. The thick line shows the spreads (in percentage of the observed values) after 
the rating transition is incorporated. Panels A1 and A2 (the upper two panels) are for the 
CG model for 4-year and 10-year bonds respectively; Panels B1 and B2 (the lower two 
panels) are for the LT model for 4-year and 10-year bonds respectively.  
                                                
21 For example, Carty (1997) reports that “there is a relatively greater chance for a non-defaulting B-rated 
issuer to enjoy a net upgrade than a non-defaulting Ba-rated issuer”. 
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As desired, Figure 3 shows the three-factor model is able to explain a larger percentage of 
the spread for high quality bonds.  For B bonds, the model-explained portion drops after 
the transition factor is incorporated.  For example, the CG model’s explanatory power on 
the B bonds drops from 92% to 61% for 4-year bonds.  Stated differently, models with 
only default and taxes would require relatively minuscule liquidity premiums for B bonds 
to accurately match the observed default rates.  Indeed, a reduction in the explained 
spread for B bonds is required to both allow a liquidity premium and mitigated the 
potential overshooting problem for the junk bonds. 
 
Figure 4 documents the unexplained portion of the observed spreads, which is 
attributable to illiquidity.  The upper three panels are expressed in basis points and lower 
three panels are in percentage of the total observed spreads.  In Panel A1, the CG model 
predicts a higher illiquidity premium (in basis points) on BB bonds than on other ratings 
(including B bonds) for both 4- and 10-year maturity. This is the most direct evidence 
that a model with default and taxes cannot satisfactorily explain the spreads by assigning 
the unexplained portion to liquidity risk.  Furthermore, when we express the results in 
percentage terms (in Panels A2 and B2), both the CG and LT models demonstrated the 
same pattern: the relative liquidity premium is highest on BBB. This serves as indirect 
evidence of the rating transition factor we have focused on in this study.  Panels C1 and 
C2 present our results from both models for 4- and 10-year bonds after incorporating 
rating transition risk. Indeed, not only did the model-inferred liquidity premium in basis 
points move up as rating declines (in Panel C1), but this is also true in percentage terms 
(shown by Panel C2 in contrast with A2 and B2).22  
 
To summarize the findings, we note that the U-shape ratings-related pattern (with the 
minimum at BBB) is basically removed.23  The model-explained portion of the observed 
spreads goes up considerably for almost all ratings, especially for the BBB bonds. The 
model’s relative explanatory power drops for the B bonds, which in fact helps to mitigate 
the potential overshooting problem of these models for junk bonds. The improvements 
range from a few to tens of percentage points.   
 
                                                
22 Finally, we checked the results for sensitivity to the risk neutral transition matrix. For example, Guan 
(2006) uses a different method to estimate the transition matrix. Carty (1997) and Altman et al (2004) draw 
attention to the volatility of agency-rating migration matrix. We altered the elements in the base-case 
matrix by a few to more than 10 percentage points.  Again, the results are robust. 
23 Although the CG model still shows a weak U-shape for the 4-year bonds, the model performance 
increases by more than 10 percentage points, which is quite significant. 
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Figure 3. Defaultable bond spreads with personal taxes with and without rating transition. The upper panels are 
for the CG model and the lower for the LT model. The two left panels are for 4-year bonds and the two right for 10-
year bonds. The personal tax rate is chosen (23%) such that the equity return tax rate, estimated as a weighted average 
of personal income and capital gains tax rates, i.e., ( ) δτατδτ +−= 1E ,  is equal to 12 percent estimated by 
Graham (1999).  We note that incorporating rating transition risk into the model considerably increases the explanatory 
power of both models for all ratings (except B bonds); especially the U-shape pattern (dipping at BBB) is removed or 
greatly reduced.  
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Figure 4. Model-inferred liquidity premium. The upper panels are in basis points and the lower panels are expressed 
in the percentage of the total observed spreads. In Panel A1, the CG model after calibrated with taxes implies that 
liquidity premium is lower on B bonds than on some investment-grade bonds, a quite disturbing result. Notice the 
hump-shapes pattern in Panels A2 and B2 is replaced with generally upward-sloping curves after the incorporation of 
rating transition risk (shown in Panel C2), which is more consistent with the nature of ratings-liquidity relationship. 
 
 
 
5d.  Financial Crisis and Model Performance 
 
The recent financial turmoil, especially the subprime crisis, has posed serious challenges 
to financial industry and academia. To see how our model performs in light of these new 
developments, we focus on a new sample period of 2004-2010. The main reason to 
choose this sample period is data availability and a desire to challenge our model with the 
2007-2009 subprime crisis. Table 3 shows the results. Panels A and B are for the CG 
model over short-term and medium-term horizons, and C and D are for the LT model. 
Following Rossi (2012), we report both short-term (one month to four years) and 
medium-term (four year to ten year) horizons.  
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YIELD SPREADS AND LIQUIDIY PREMIUM: 2004-2010 
 
This table shows the observed spreads (Rossi, 2012) for the period of 2004-2010 and the model-predicted values by 
considering default risk, taxes, and rating transition. For example, “Default + Tax” means the model considers credit 
risk, personal taxes, and their interactions jointly. The two right-hand-side columns are for results when all three factors 
are considered. The implied liquidity premium is reported in the relative term as a percentage of the total observed 
spreads. Default rate and rating transition data used for model calibration and model implementation are from S&P 
Global Credit Portal (2011) covering 1981 through 2010. Following Rossi (2012), we present two horizons, short- and 
medium-term horizons representing average of yield spreads for 1 month to 4 years, and 4 years to 10 years, 
respectively. 
  
(A) CG Model, T = short-term 
Rating Observed Spreads (bps) 
Default + Tax Default + Tax + Transition 
Spreads 
(bps) 
Liquidity 
premium (%) 
Spreads 
(bps) 
Liquidity 
premium (%) 
AA 67 43 36 51 24 
A 103 58 44 72 30 
BBB 158 84 47 122 23 
BB 343 317 8 289 16 
B 429 450 5 352 18 
 
 
(B) CG Model, T = medium-term 
Rating Observed Spreads (bps) 
Def + Tax Def + Tax + Transition 
Spreads 
(bps) 
Liquidity 
premium (%) 
Spreads 
(bps) 
Liquidity 
premium (%) 
AA 80 61 24 82 -3 
A 111 77 31 111 0 
BBB 235 98 58 168 29 
BB 412 301 27 289 30 
B 558 590 -6 397 29 
 
(C) LT Model, T = short-term 
Rating Observed Spreads (bps) 
Def + Tax Def + Tax + Transition 
Spreads 
(bps) 
Liquidity 
premium (%) 
Spreads 
(bps) 
Liquidity 
premium (%) 
AA 67 64 4 70 4 
A 103 89 14 102 1 
BBB 158 124 22 154 3 
BB 343 330 4 299 13 
B 429 416 3 344 20 
 
 
(D) LT Model, T = medium-term 
Rating Observed Spreads (bps) 
Def + Tax Def + Tax + Transition 
Spreads 
(bps) 
Liquidity 
premium (%) 
Spreads 
(bps) 
Liquidity 
premium (%) 
AA 80 83 -4 90 -13 
A 111 94 15 115 -4 
BBB 235 114 51 175 26 
BB 412 282 32 284 31 
B 558 568 -2 421 25 
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Similar to our main findings using an earlier dataset (1973-1993), the structural models 
with personal taxes and default risk imply a U-shaped unexplained portion of the 
observed spreads. In other words, the models imply the greatest (percentage) liquidity 
premium for BBB rating. For example, in Panel C for the LT model, without rating 
transition, liquidity premium accounts for about 4% of the total yield spreads for AA, BB 
and B bonds, while it becomes 22% for BBB bond. All four cases share this characteristic. 
As we argue earlier, this pattern of model-implied liquidity premium is hard to explain, 
given the fact that investment-grade bonds are far more liquid than junk bonds. However, 
if we further incorporate rating transition, the U-shaped pattern of the liquidity premium 
vanishes. Out of the four cases we investigate, three show a clear increase of liquidity 
premium as bond rating declines. The only case that does not show this trend is the CG 
model for the short-term bonds. However, it still makes a significant relative 
improvement versus the very counter-intuitive pattern found when ignoring rating 
transitions. These findings once again show that incorporating rating transition in the 
structural framework indeed makes a desirable and essential improvement. 
 
The recent budget crisis in the U.S. resulted in an unprecedented downgrade of the 
government debt. This certainly casts a system-wide impact on the debt market and 
beyond, including the corporate and international bond markets. Bond yields would be 
affected across the board. However, as long as we still use the yield on the government 
bond as the baseline even if we no longer consider it risk-free rate, corporate yield 
spreads would not be affected as much. In other words, we expect our model to perform 
reasonably well under the shadow of the U.S. budget crisis, which looms over the 
foreseeable future. 
 
5e. Model Limitations: Financial Crisis and International Market  
 
The approach we propose has its limitations. For example, in one case shown in Panel D 
of Table 3, after incorporating rating transition, the LT model implies -13% and -4% 
liquidity premium. for AA and A ratings, respectively. Certainly, a negative value makes 
no sense. Instead, it means that our model has overshot its yield prediction for these two 
ratings.  
 
The financial crisis has brought system-wide turmoil, which may reveal a limitation in 
our approach. During a crisis as serious as the subprime loan crisis, market moves 
violently and the volatility would be poorly captured by the common (geometric) 
Brownian motion. This is the well-known fat-tail distribution of risk. Brownian motion, 
relatively easier and more tractable, tends to describe routine, small and independent risks 
better. When the whole market is experiencing a crisis, psychology and irrationality can 
no longer be assumed away and market-wide herding effect becomes more pronounced. 
Some of these effects may be better captured by more complicated mechanisms, such as 
Levy process.  
 
International environment poses another limitation. Specifically, different countries may 
have quite different tax practices. Our approach is strictly based on the U.S. tax 
environment. How to adjust the tax treatment in the model for different countries remains 
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to be a significant challenge. For example, China is removing taxes on corporate bonds. 
Australia uses the imputation system where personal tax is linked to the amount of 
corporate tax a specific company pays. In other words, personal tax depends on how 
much corporate tax the issuing corporation pays, which is quite different from the US’s 
tax system. In addition to the tax complication, political risk can be come a major 
concern when we move from the domestic to international environment. Furthermore, 
currency exchange rate risk can be a daily concern for firms operating globally.  Once 
again, these risks are real but not captured by our approach. Some of them, perhaps the 
exchange rate risk, may be relatively easier to model within the structural framework. 
Others are considerably more difficult to reliably address and therefore may require 
different methodology. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
The spreads generated by structural models for defaultable and taxable bonds reveal a 
strong rating-related pattern that cannot be characterized by liquidity. We argue existing 
structural models suffer from a perilous weakness.  Quite simply, they implicitly only 
allow two states of nature: default and no default without rating changes, whereas the 
probability of bonds being upgraded/downgraded is ignored in the current structural 
models.  We design a framework that combines the structural models with rating 
transition risk to account for this missing factor, the overall model performance is 
considerably improved: it explains more of the observed spreads on investment-grade 
ratings not only in basis points but also in the relative percentage terms, and on the other 
hand mitigates the overshooting problem exhibited by some structural models for junk 
bonds. Most importantly, we are able to remove the unreasonable rating-specific pattern 
in the implied liquidity premium. By capturing the risk of rating migration, significantly 
more sensible results are obtained. That is, the unexplained portion of the total spreads is 
consistent with the nature of liquidity risk. This paper's noteworthy findings are a 
moderate step forward in exploring the credit spread puzzle.  
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